As if The Bat never happened 29 June, 2007
Posted by Zack in 2008, Dean Bat, FEC Deadlines, Howard Dean, Joe Trippi, Online Fundraising.8 comments
On this day in the parallel universe of the 2003-2004 cycle, we were all watching history being made. The politics of money in presidential primaries was being turned on its head forever by a daring gamble by Joe Trippi. Or so we thought at the time. None of the 2008 campaigns on either side have attempted to repeat the Dean 2003 miracle. As a result, no second tier candidate will break into the first tier, and Big Money will dominate just as it did in the first quarter of this year.
As we entered these last 48 hours before the June 2003 FEC filing deadline, it had become clear that Trippi’s Big Gamble was, unbelievably, beginning to work. Days earlier, he had stepped outside of the fundraising expectations management game and started up a new game all his own.
Just days before the FEC deadline, Trippi sent an email to supporters in which he came right out and admitted Dean had not raised enough money in the 2nd quarter to be taken seriously any longer (he was only just barely taken seriously as it stood). Dean would, essentially, be out of the running when the results came out.
So Trippi asked Dean supporters to make the impossible possible: to turn the dark horse, no-chance, insurgent candidate into the winner of the Money Primary–to show for the fist time ever that grassroots donors could over power the lobbyists, the lawyers and the CEOs. Specifically, he told them (in a series of emails that kept pushing the goal higher and higher) that if they donated an additional several million dollars in the last days of the quarter, that Dean would blow past the expected fundraising totals of John Kerry and John Edwards, the two leading establishment candidates. He told Dean supporters that this was a fool proof way to use the establishment’s own stupid rules against it. The media would have to anoint Dean the new frontrunner if he beat the current frontrunners at their own money game.
Many inside the campaign thought Trippi’s gamble was crazy. They didn’t believe supporters would or could donate what was needed. The gamble would dramatically raise expectations, precisely when the campaign should be doing everything it could to lower them.
Because, and only because, Trippi was the campaign manager, and not an “Internet guy,” he had the power to pull the trigger and go ahead with his gamble.
The Internet team created a special graphic progress meter for the gamble: a baseball player holding an inflated bat. (“Hit one out of the park for Dean!”) The bat quickly became a rallying point for Dean supporters. Posted and reposted on the campaign blog and other blogs, and always available and (mostly) up-to-date on the campaign’s contribution page, the bat was the physical symbol of how much supporters had accomplished and how far they had to go. The bat induced many supporters to give over and over again.
Two days before the deadline–which is right where we are today–it was clear that the gamble was working. Dean had caught up to where Kerry and Edwards were rumored to be, around five million dollars for the quarter.
From this point on, every donation became an offensive, rather than a defensive move. The grassroots simply couldn’t believe that it was winning at the Big Money game it had always loathed. The effort gained new momentum as thousands who had just given gave again.
Many staff at all the other Democratic campaigns were glued to their screens on that Sunday and Monday, the last two days of the quarter. They couldn’t control themselves. Many Kerry and Edwards staff especially were overcome with dismay. Laws of politics which seemed as predictable as the laws of physics had been suspended–it was like someone shut off gravity. Others couldn’t help but be swept up in the excitement. Carol Moseley Braun’s finance director couldn’t stop herself from contributing to Dean herself–and was fired a couple weeks later when the FEC reports came out. (She quickly found a job at Dean.)
Why haven’t any lagging candidates–especially John Edwards or John McCain–dramatically called upon their bases to catapult them forward this quarter? And why have all the candidates so prioritized high dollar fundraising over small dollar fundraising? (For example, the ratio of grassroots fundraising to high-dollar event fundraising totals last quarter was roughly the inverse of Dean’s Q2 2003 ratio.)
Sure, everyone’s sending out urgent fundraising emails asking for support at this “critical deadline.” And there are progress meters. But no one has staked their campaign on this moment–even candidates who could conceivably be knocked almost out of the race by it.
The reason is this: Dean’s June 2003 miracle was not accomplished by an email–or by any clever web strategy. It was accomplished by a special and sincere promise to its supporter base: “We’re going to stand for what’s right–and we’re relying completely on you to give us the strength to succeed.”
It was something similar to John McCain’s 2000 campaign, which was the first big show of grassroots online fundraising power. In both McCain 2000 and Dean 2004, you could see the sincerity and the passion in the candidate himself. In both cases, only half the credit goes to the candidate. The other half goes to campaign managers and media consultants who were not afraid of real passion and real honesty.
In this race, I think we’ve got some candidates who’ve got incredibly exciting stuff going on inside their heads. With the right support, I think they’d be ready to have an amazing relationship with their supporter bases, and would love to be running a Dean 2004 or McCain 2000 style of campaign (at least in terms of passion and sincerity).
So it turns out–at least for now– that Trippi 2003 was a fluke, a lesson that went unlearned. (Sure Trippi’s at Edwards now, but not in charge.) The grassroots will continue to use the Internet and other new technology to assert its influence on the 2008 cycle. The local communities and national networks that were forged in the 2004 cycle have continued to grow and thrive. Now, on both sides, they’re enthusiastically gearing up for this new fight. But so far, all of the major candidates and campaign managers continue to relate to this base only through gimmicks and abstract references to “the grassroots nature of my campaign.”
March 2007: the New June 2003 15 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in 2008, Fundraising, Howard Dean, Joe Trippi, Online organizing.5 comments
Dear candidates and campaign managers:
Why is it, after grassroots donors gave hundreds of millions of dollars to Dem presidential candidates in the 2004 cycle, that you are now completely ignoring them in this cycle? I’m not saying you shouldn’t be courting large donors. But instead of spending ALL your time between high-dollar fundraisers and donor “call time,” why not just spend at least 15 or 20 minutes per day doing things to win the hearts of the mass base of Democratic donors and activists?
And sorry, but your online videos and cool websites do not win hearts. Only genuine attention and creativity from you, the candidates and campaign managers, will do that.
It was genuine personal attention and creativity by both Howard Dean and Joe Trippi that created the conditions in which their campaign raised something like $40 million online. You had Dean speaking from the heart, every day, in a non-phony way, about the base and its centrality to the campaign. It wasn’t just that he said the things he did–it was that he really meant them. He had somehow (and I still don’t understand how it happened) made a break with “normal politician mode” and switched over to normal human being mode. (Yes, of course, the night of the Iowa primary, when the presidential campaign switched from its base-phase to its national-phase, that would have been a great time to start acting a little more like a “normal politician,” but that’s another story.)
For his part, Trippi was making almost all his big campaign strategy decisions with the goal of winning over and mobilizing the base as his top priority. (And yes, it would have been better if he had made a few traditional decisions better, such as fixing the Iowa field operation. But that’s also another story.)
But in this cycle, all of you seem to be acting as though Dean and Trippi proved nothing. And so today I’m making a prediction–one that I hope you’ll prove wrong: no Democratic candidate will be beat Dean’s record of raising around $40 million online before Iowa.
Many among the netroots would be happy about such a failure, since they were so annoyed by all the fundraising in the ’04 cycle. But there are two reasons such a failure would be very bad news for progressives and for politics in general: First, all of you will still eventually resort to ceaseless fundraising in this race–only, without a real connection and without big email lists, you won’t raise very much, so it will all be in vain. Second, if small grassroots donors do not dominate this cycle as they did in 2004, then one of the most beautiful reversals in the history of U.S. politics–that of small donors coming out stronger, earlier and more decisively than big donors–will have been erased.
I think part of what’s happening is that you guys are misunderstanding what happened in the Dean campaign that brought in all that money (or maybe you’re being misinformed). Maybe you think the secret to Dean’s success in online fundraising were his cool online tools (that would explain Obama’s bragging about his tools in his announcement video). Or maybe you think it was his popularity in the blogosphere (that would explain why so many of your are falling over each other to please bloggers).
But if you go back to that game-changing 2nd quarter FEC filing deadline, you’ll see that it wasn’t either of those things. What happened in that incredible moment was that Trippi, with Dean’s sign off, did something extraordinary. He released his quarterly fundraising total a week before the reporting deadline (unthinkable according to the conventional wisdom of primary campaign strategy). Trippi put all the cards on the table and he reached out to the base and said:
“We’re behind the big money candidates. We’re behind, and if we stay behind, this campaign is over. We’re putting our campaign in your hands. It’s up to you whether Howard Dean can compete against the big donors and the establishment. It’s up to you–and you actually have the power to not only keep him in the race, but to make him the front runner.”
The campaign put a progress bar (The Bat!) up to show the base exactly how far they had to go to make Dean the front runner. And the base stood up and delivered.
That was the second quarter of 2003. In this race, everything is moved up a quarter. So that same drama of the last week of June will this time take place in the last week of March. Hey–what do you know: that’s right around the corner!
That strategy can work for any candidate: “establishment” or underdog. If you’re the Big Money candidate, don’t be afraid to own it: ask your base to put you so far ahead (like Bush in 2000) that the contest will be settled early and you’ll be able to conserve your funds for what will certainly be a brutal general election battle; tell the base that’s the key to winning in 2008.
If you’re the underdog, then do what Dean did and ask small donors to drown out Big Money by making their voices heard and their power felt so strongly that the Earth shakes (like it did in 2003). Your finance directors will worry that such an underdog message will alienate large donors–but that’s just silly. They don’t care. They get it. Ask a few of them this afternoon when you’re doing your “call time.”
Of course you should keep doing your high-dollar fundraisers. You absolutely should set up pyramid schemes like Bush’s Pioneer/Ranger racket. But you should also take some time out of every day to call upon the base, directly, honestly, like a real human being speaking to other real human beings. Yes, that means sending them notes via email that you write yourself, and personally posting on your blog. But it also means that when you’re making those critical decisions that shape your campaignâ€â€in the back of the plane with only your top consultant and top advisorâ€â€you should be asking: Is there anything we can do here to involve the base? Is there any way we can do this differently to involve them and rely upon them?
Politics will benefit regardless of which of you puts your campaign in the hands of the base–just so long as one of your does it. But if no one does it, then it turns out that what happened in 2003 didn’t change politics after all.