Party like it’s 1929 28 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in the bubble.1 comment so far
Housing bubble!
Stock bubble!
Tech bubble!
Oh My!
How would a world economic collapse affect the ’08 race?
Hard to say, since none of the candidates–or any of their minions–either D or R can even conceive of the possibility right now.
What would you do?
March 2007: the New June 2003 15 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in 2008, Fundraising, Howard Dean, Joe Trippi, Online organizing.5 comments
Dear candidates and campaign managers:
Why is it, after grassroots donors gave hundreds of millions of dollars to Dem presidential candidates in the 2004 cycle, that you are now completely ignoring them in this cycle? I’m not saying you shouldn’t be courting large donors. But instead of spending ALL your time between high-dollar fundraisers and donor “call time,” why not just spend at least 15 or 20 minutes per day doing things to win the hearts of the mass base of Democratic donors and activists?
And sorry, but your online videos and cool websites do not win hearts. Only genuine attention and creativity from you, the candidates and campaign managers, will do that.
It was genuine personal attention and creativity by both Howard Dean and Joe Trippi that created the conditions in which their campaign raised something like $40 million online. You had Dean speaking from the heart, every day, in a non-phony way, about the base and its centrality to the campaign. It wasn’t just that he said the things he did–it was that he really meant them. He had somehow (and I still don’t understand how it happened) made a break with “normal politician mode” and switched over to normal human being mode. (Yes, of course, the night of the Iowa primary, when the presidential campaign switched from its base-phase to its national-phase, that would have been a great time to start acting a little more like a “normal politician,” but that’s another story.)
For his part, Trippi was making almost all his big campaign strategy decisions with the goal of winning over and mobilizing the base as his top priority. (And yes, it would have been better if he had made a few traditional decisions better, such as fixing the Iowa field operation. But that’s also another story.)
But in this cycle, all of you seem to be acting as though Dean and Trippi proved nothing. And so today I’m making a prediction–one that I hope you’ll prove wrong: no Democratic candidate will be beat Dean’s record of raising around $40 million online before Iowa.
Many among the netroots would be happy about such a failure, since they were so annoyed by all the fundraising in the ’04 cycle. But there are two reasons such a failure would be very bad news for progressives and for politics in general: First, all of you will still eventually resort to ceaseless fundraising in this race–only, without a real connection and without big email lists, you won’t raise very much, so it will all be in vain. Second, if small grassroots donors do not dominate this cycle as they did in 2004, then one of the most beautiful reversals in the history of U.S. politics–that of small donors coming out stronger, earlier and more decisively than big donors–will have been erased.
I think part of what’s happening is that you guys are misunderstanding what happened in the Dean campaign that brought in all that money (or maybe you’re being misinformed). Maybe you think the secret to Dean’s success in online fundraising were his cool online tools (that would explain Obama’s bragging about his tools in his announcement video). Or maybe you think it was his popularity in the blogosphere (that would explain why so many of your are falling over each other to please bloggers).
But if you go back to that game-changing 2nd quarter FEC filing deadline, you’ll see that it wasn’t either of those things. What happened in that incredible moment was that Trippi, with Dean’s sign off, did something extraordinary. He released his quarterly fundraising total a week before the reporting deadline (unthinkable according to the conventional wisdom of primary campaign strategy). Trippi put all the cards on the table and he reached out to the base and said:
“We’re behind the big money candidates. We’re behind, and if we stay behind, this campaign is over. We’re putting our campaign in your hands. It’s up to you whether Howard Dean can compete against the big donors and the establishment. It’s up to you–and you actually have the power to not only keep him in the race, but to make him the front runner.”
The campaign put a progress bar (The Bat!) up to show the base exactly how far they had to go to make Dean the front runner. And the base stood up and delivered.
That was the second quarter of 2003. In this race, everything is moved up a quarter. So that same drama of the last week of June will this time take place in the last week of March. Hey–what do you know: that’s right around the corner!
That strategy can work for any candidate: “establishment” or underdog. If you’re the Big Money candidate, don’t be afraid to own it: ask your base to put you so far ahead (like Bush in 2000) that the contest will be settled early and you’ll be able to conserve your funds for what will certainly be a brutal general election battle; tell the base that’s the key to winning in 2008.
If you’re the underdog, then do what Dean did and ask small donors to drown out Big Money by making their voices heard and their power felt so strongly that the Earth shakes (like it did in 2003). Your finance directors will worry that such an underdog message will alienate large donors–but that’s just silly. They don’t care. They get it. Ask a few of them this afternoon when you’re doing your “call time.”
Of course you should keep doing your high-dollar fundraisers. You absolutely should set up pyramid schemes like Bush’s Pioneer/Ranger racket. But you should also take some time out of every day to call upon the base, directly, honestly, like a real human being speaking to other real human beings. Yes, that means sending them notes via email that you write yourself, and personally posting on your blog. But it also means that when you’re making those critical decisions that shape your campaignâ€â€in the back of the plane with only your top consultant and top advisorâ€â€you should be asking: Is there anything we can do here to involve the base? Is there any way we can do this differently to involve them and rely upon them?
Politics will benefit regardless of which of you puts your campaign in the hands of the base–just so long as one of your does it. But if no one does it, then it turns out that what happened in 2003 didn’t change politics after all.
Wikipedia could solve its cash-flow troubles in ten minues 10 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in Fundraising, Web2.0Schmeb2.0.5 comments
Apparently, Wikimedia (the org behind Wikipedia) is having cash-flow problems. It costs a lot to keep one of the world’s most popular sites up, and Wikimedia is 100% funded by donationsâ€â€donations that have been coming in too slowly. Blogger Philippe Mottaz was one person to report a dire warning from Wikimedia’s spokesperson recently:
“At this point, Wikipedia has the financial resources to run its servers for about 3 to 4 months. If we do not find additional funding, it is not impossible that Wikipedia might disappearâ€Â. The warning by Florence Devouard, chairwoman of the Wikimedia Foundation was certainly dire, and Lift07 was as good a venue to make an appeal. But it is another illustration of how difficult it is to find the proper business model in the digital age, and more precisely in this case in what Florence called the “gift economyâ€Â.
Now, goto Wikipedia.org and look for the donation button. There isn’t one. If you click on the link for the English home page or go to any other Wikipedia page, then, if your eyes are good enough, you might be able to make out the tiny 7pt italic text, “Your continued donations keep Wikipedia running!”
The Web2.0 crowd hates the very idea of fundraising. But surely a larger and more convincing fundraising link (or button!) is preferable to Wikipedia disappearing. That would take about 10 minutes.
If the situation is really as dire as it sounds, then why not go a little further? For one day per month, place an interstitial message over a shadowed-out home page that explains that Wikipedia relies on donations and asks people to make one. There would be a very large and visible, “Sorry, I can’t” button to let people get right to the site if they don’t donate. It would take them about 30 minutes to rig that up. And it would bring in several million dollars each day they do it (that is based on watching the speed of their past fundraising campaigns where they put a progress bar at the top). Maybe they’d only have to do it once per quarter.
They could also have more fun with this: for example, a YouTube ad contest where people will find all sorts of creative and irreverent ways to beg on Wikipedia’s behalf.
This is really important stuffâ€â€Wikipedia is the one example of a major site that lives off of donations and provides a vital service to hundreds of millions of people. It’s a shame that a non-profit competitor to MySpace or FaceBook hasn’t emerged. They are now the public square for the the country’s young peopleâ€â€but a public square that’s privately owned. If Wikimedia shows it can be done, then maybe others will try the “gift economy” model in other places.
Don’t just hire a blogger, BE the blogger! (A community manifesto for 2008) 9 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in 2008, Online organizing.4 comments
The BloggerGate controversy raised a lot of interesting questionsâ€â€but one I didn’t hear was: “Why aren’t the candidates their own bloggers?” And this goes for email tooâ€â€the alternate title for this post could be: “Write your own emails, damn it!”
This is not a criticism of Internet staff on campaigns (I’ve been there, I know it’s not up to you). This is not even a criticism of candidates or campaign managersâ€â€it’s just an attempt at a wake up call: This is a whole new medium, a whole new channel for your own voiceâ€â€you don’t ask someone else give your speeches or appear in your TV ads. So why have someone who barely knows you writing personal messages in your name that go out to millions of your most passionate fans and volunteers?
The list below is just a first quick take. Go to the New Organizing Institute wiki and add your own reasons, change the order, and modify the current ones. Let’s make this a community product.
Top Ten Reasons For Presidential Candidates to
Write Their Own Emails and Blog Posts:
- The people who have signed up on your email list and who read your blog are your die-hard supporters. These people love you and are going to pour their hearts into your campaign over the next year (or two, if you win). These people deserve better than canned messages written by an “Internet guy” who doesn’t even know you.
- If you write the messages yourself and really put something of yourself into them, then your supporters who receive them will be far more engaged in your campaign  that means they will do more work and donate more money.
- If you can spend six hours per day on high-dollar fundraising, you can take 15 minutes to jot out a note to your supporters.
- As someone running for president, you have one of the most interesting lives out of anyone in the world. And yet the canned emails and blog posts we get from you reflect none of that. You have ten amazing stories to tell every single day: tell them!
- Having some “Internet guy” write your messages is soooooo 2004! People are sick of those canned, formula emails. No one reads them anymore. Actually, no one read them in 2004 either. So wake up to this new medium and put yourself into it the same as you do with, say, television.
- Now that everyone is opting out of public financing, you need to raise hundreds of millions of dollars between now and November 2008. Everyone in America is disgusted by that. The only way you will get our full participation in helping you to get to that goal is by making a real connection with us and winning our trust that you won’t blow it all on sucky adds like they did last time.
- Because you’ll have fun doing it!
- ?
- ?
- ?
Go to the New Organizing Institute wiki and add your voice.
Suggestion for Google 6 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in google suggestion.3 comments
This would be fun.
Gmail and Google Calendar currently work together to try to figure out whether an email mentions a meeting or event. Gmail gives you a little link next to your email that adds the guessed appointment to you calendar. It’s still usually wrong, but very gradually getting better.
Why not give geeks the ability to submit the regular expression that would have successfully pulled the correct time and date out of the email. I’m not sure how the Google developers would coherently integrate all those expressions into the system, but seems like there should be a way.
In exchange for our regexes, just credit our names in the Google code baseâ€â€better than getting your own Hollywood star!
Will Obama put on the makeup? 4 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in 2008, Online organizing, progressive strategy.37 comments
Everyone knows the story about the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debate. Nixon showed up at the debate pale, with a terrible 5:00 shadow, and his shirt didn’t fit. He refused to wear makeup to improve his appearance on TV, fearing embarrassment in the press. Even though his performance was comparable to Kennedy’s, he lost the debate in the voter’s minds because he just looked awful.
It was a matter of failing to understand the new medium of televisionâ€â€of failing to understand it personally, at the highest level of the campaign, at the level of the candidate, campaign manger and senior aides. They knew how important television wasâ€â€but they still thought of it as some new fangled thing external to politics. Sure, they had media consultants, but they weren’t around when he was putting on his shirt that night, and when he was being asked whether or not he wanted makeup. It wasn’t enough to have TV consultants, Nixon and is inner circle of two or three top aides needed to understand the medium themselves.
Today, of course, all candidates and campaign managers know they must understand television, and media consultants sit within the inner-most circle informing and overseeing every single decisionâ€â€even down to what shirt to wear for debate night.
For the Internet in politics, it’s 1960 again. And I can’t tell you how painful it is, as someone who knows the power of this medium, to watch a candidate with as much potential as Obama just blowing itâ€â€just like Nixon did with TV in his first run.
Obama and his senior aides aren’t doing the deep thinking they need to do on their own about this medium. They, like most of their competitors, have delegated “the Internet thing” to staffers who are far outside of the inner circle (“senior staff” is not the inner circle), and have refused to take personal responsibility for understanding the potentials of the medium on their own. In Obama’s case, it’s inexcusable because the Internet is just dying to make him president.
The result is that he is making major campaign decisions without regard to potentials for base building on the Internetâ€â€most important among them: how to launch the campaign. I know that they would say, “We ARE taking it seriously!” I’ve heard this from campaigns a thousand times. And they think they mean it. But the “Internet strategy” is still something separate, and still not something for which the inner-circle takes full personal responsibility. They need to think about the Internet with the same intensity, curiosity and rigor that they apply to television, polling, speech writing/making and debate performance. This is the cycle when it is just complete idiocy to treat base-building through the Internet with one iota less seriousness than those other critical areas.
One reason it’s so hard for traditional campaign people to understand the Internet is that, for campaigns, it is primarily a grassroots organizing medium. Obama was a grassroots organizer for three years after college. If he puts that organizer hat back on, personally, and figures out this medium, then he should have a great advantage.
If he did that, here’s the kind of thing he’d start coming up with. On February 10th, when he will announce his candidacy, there’s an incredibly simple tactic he could employ to build a massive instant supporter base onlineâ€â€one that would supply hundreds of thousands of boots on the ground as well as tens of millions of dollars in the primary:
Obama should announce that he is determined to run, but he should say: “I’m only going to run if one million people sign up to work on this campaignâ€â€one million because that’s only a down-payment on the movement it’s going to take to win this election.”
The rest of his announcement speech should be all about the amazing grassroots movement it’s going to take to winâ€â€not just the primary, but to beat the Republican money machine in the general.
He should keep his Exploratory Committee in place for the three weeks that it will take him to get to a million. The whole time, the press will be grilling him, “Will you really drop out if a million people don’t sign up?” He’ll have to answer without hesitation: “Yes! Because it’s going to take a massive grassroots movement not only to win this electionâ€â€but to change the country.” (His traditional campaign advisors would be pulling their hair out in terror and confusion.)
The press will not shut up about Obama’s crazy “million person” sign up tactic. And that’s exactly what will drive the people to sign up. Each day they’ll give the tally. As long as the number is under a million, then the press attention will only grow. There’s not a lot of risk here. Some kid on Facebook had the same idea‗A million strong for Obama”â€â€and more than 200,000 people have already signed up…just some random kid, not Obama. A million people would sign up in no time for Obama if he asked.
Oh waitâ€â€it may not be obvious why it’s so important to have those million+ supporters signed up. What would such an online email base bring? For starters: a ton of volunteers on the ground, a vibrant community of activists all across the country, an instant foundation for a “First Four,” and even a Super Tuesday, field campaign (provided they have a field director who knows what to do with all those email addresses!).
But here’s what the campaign really wants to hear, and what is in fact true: those million signed-up supporters will be worth tens of millions of dollars every quarter from now right up to Iowa. And the million is just a start: if he plays his cards right, that list will double, triple, even quadruple before Iowa.
If he doesn’t pull that “million” trick, he won’t have a million until Iowa (the signups will come in at an enviable rate, but not all at once). He will still raise a lot of money online, but not enough to out-do the massive fundraising power of…well, you know who.
But just you watch: He and his campaign manager are going to leave it to “the Internet guy” to sort out. And the problem isn’t that “the Internet guy” is not smartâ€â€in fact, he’s brilliant! But he’s not Obama. And he is not sitting in that inner circle. And, no, I don’t mean “senior staff”â€â€I mean the candidate’s kitchen table when he’s hammering out those giant decisions such as: “How do we launch?”
Let’s dream, and imagine that Obama did do the “million thing,” instantly growing an industrial-strength supporter base online. Then he will need to continue, everyday, to drive the communication with that base himself. (And this is something that all candidates need to hear.)
There is a standard form of political email communication that has been established in the world of non-profits and political campaignsâ€â€and it is death. I must confess that I’m one of the half-dozen or so people who brought this form into the position of total domination that it now holds. But before you hunt us down to punish us for the damage done to your inbox, please understand something: we were forced into that awful, soulless form of communicationâ€â€forced to send out all those crappy, disembodied emails because the candidates and their inner circles (on whatever past campaign) could not be bothered with something as “trivial” as emailâ€â€even when the email was going to millions of supporters, and raising tens of millions of dollars.
And the medium was still so new and fresh that we got away with it. Dear leaders, we “Internet people” did the best we could without your involvement. We raised a lot of money with those ridiculous emails signed in your names. But guess what? People hate them now. We scorched the Earth. There’s not one sucker left who will take seriously an email signed, “Barak” that’s actually written by Obama’s, “Internet guy.” OK, to be honest, there are a few suckers left. You will raise some money. But not enough. You need $100 million before Iowa. I bet you there’s not even $20 million for you if you do it the old, stupid way and simply bombard people’s inboxes with disingenuous, fake crap. And, as you know, $20 million isn’t enough this time around.
So, candidates, that leaves you with one option: write your own damn emails. And why not? You’re spending several hours each day right now doing “call time”â€â€harassing big donors for $4,400 checks. But how much do you actually raise per hour that way? $30,000? $40,000? But if you built a genuine relationship with your email list, then each email would be worth twice thatâ€â€even if you didn’t ask for money in the email (but only included a “donate” button at the bottom). And each time you actually ask, so long as you have a good reason, you’ll make millions per email.
Building a “genuine relationship” with your supporter base online doesn’t mean simply writing the same boring emails, but writing them yourself. No, it means writing to your supporters from the campaign trail in the same way that you might write to your spouse (without the smoochy stuff) or to a close friend: tell them the exciting things you experienced that day, what they made you think of, a joke you heard, and what occurred to you is really at stake. Some emails could be four pages, and some could be four sentences. Maybe sometimes you should just send a picture you snapped yourself.
If you write to people like that, I promise you, they will go nuts. You will have something amazing on your hands. And you will have taken politics up to a whole new level of honesty and integrity.
I’ve had a chance to make this pitch to many candidates and politicians over the last several years, but I’ve always felt like I was talking in a foreign language. I say, “Write to peopleâ€â€connect with peopleâ€â€yourself.” And they say, “So, what blogger king should I hire?”
But who knows, maybe Obama is the guy who will get it. After all, he used to be a community organizer. (Senator, can you remember the neighborhood leaders you worked with back then?â€â€back before you got surrounded by lobbyists, consultants and those cynical, hollow-headed people who make up so much of the political world? If so, then just write to write the emails as though you were writing to those leaders, and you’ll do a fantastic job of it. This is an amazing medium, and you, as an organizer, should be able to perform magic with it. Remember how, to get people to show up to the organizing committee meeting, you used to have to call many of the members individually? Remember the conversations you had with them? Remember how well you knew what made those people tickâ€â€and how you let them see inside you too? So, it’s the same thing here. You’re going to have these millions of supporters. But if you actually want all of them to work for you and donate too, then you’re going to have to connect with them one-on-one. The amazing thing, my fellow organizer, is that this new medium allows you to connect just as personally and just as directly as you used to on the phone and even at the doorâ€â€but with an unlimited number of people at one click of the “send” button.)
If candidates think they can outsource their emails to “Internet guys,” then why not outsource their role in ads to actors? When they do “call time” to large donors, why not use someone who does a good voice impersonation? You can’t outsource a real personal connection between yourself and your supporters. Come on people: you’re our leaders, this is a new medium for leadership, pick it up with your own two hands and see what you can do with it.
An Organizer’s Guide to Trusting the People (repost) 4 February, 2007
Posted by Zack in progressive strategy, The Big Stuff.2 comments
Often, we progressives fall back on blaming the American people for our failure to win elections or grow our movement. This is not only a self-defeating bad habit, it’s also based on a totally inaccurate understanding of The People. I frequently find myself trying to squeeze this argument into a single paragraph in posts and articles. It never fits. Therefore, I’m going to flesh it out here, and then perhaps I can just link over whenever I want to give people an option to hear me out.
For most of the 90′s I worked as a union organizer all over America, from big cities to far flung small towns — organizing workers at hospitals, nursing homes, factories, meat processing plants, big box stores, and working at many of those facilities myself.
I sat in the living rooms of probably a thousand families altogether. Visiting workers at home was the only way to talk safely about the union. But conversations frequently strayed from the revolution they were trying to make at work to what they thought of the problems facing the country too. People have a lot of ways of making sense of the world. They grab at straws and whatever is available to them, whether that’s Rush Limbaugh, shortwave survivalists, the History Channel, or the Bible. It’s easy to dismiss people because they’ve put together a world view from an entirely different set of building blocks from your own. And that’s exactly what I did for at least my first year as an organizer.
Like most of my fellow upper-middleclass, college-educated colleagues, I threw workers into a narrow stereotype of apolitical, apathetic “middle America.” We had grown up with it for so long, we didn’t even know we had it. This is why so much of our time as organizers was spent trying to change the way people thought before we got to the nuts and bolts of organizing the union. In the tradition of Saul Alinsky, we were trained to “dialog” with workers to help them reveal for themselves the fact of their oppression, and the one sure thing they could do about it: take collective action. (If you go to Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals or look into the work of Paulo Friere, who also greatly influenced the current generations of organizers, you’ll find the intellectual foundation for this kind of organizing.) Our job, as we were taught it, was to facilitate a self-awakening into political consciousness among the workers.
A complete change in psychology was a lot to pull off in a six week union campaign, and so we almost always lost when it came down to a vote by the workers. Afterwards, I’d hear many a young organizer lament, “What’s wrong with these people? Why are they voting against their own interests? How can they be so brainwashed?” And I was thinking the exact same thing. (And this is, of course, the same lament we hear after political elections as people curse entire ‘red’ states.)
But eventually, I started listening — really listening. My own awakening really started when I went to work inside a factory where a union campaign was taking place. There, I was able to see and hear the real reasons workers were rejecting the union. It wasn’t because they were scared or apathetic. It was usually because either (A) they saw real flaws with the union’s strategy (which suddenly, from the inside looked a lot more valid than when I was outside); or (B) technical glitches in timing and execution on the part of the union simply flummoxed the campaign in ways I hadn’t been able to see on the outside.
My awakening continued while back working as a staff organizer, when I was lucky enough to be confronted by a few groups of workers who asserted themselves in ways that made a mockery of the stereotypes I was still trying to hang on to.
To give an example, at the beginning of one campaign, a group of nursing home workers presented me with a fully laid-out, worker-written newsletter on a floppy disk — and demanded 800 copies by the next day to distribute to their coworkers. Writing “campaign lit” was the job of the organizer. So I felt immediately threatened. My next reaction was to want to edit the newsletter to make it more “on message” for the union. It was filled with short and long articles on everything from simple explanations of why they wanted a union (I wanted to bring those more in line with the official talking points) to emotional essays on why life as a care giver was so satisfying (I worried those would make people forget about the grievances that had sparked the union campaign).
The workers said, “No edits! Just print this out and we’ll distribute it.” The newsletter was an incredible hit. Workers were hiding in closets to read them. People came to the office for extra copies to give to family members. The newsletter turned out to be an incredibly powerful organizing tool because it showed people being a union, not just talking about one. It allowed the workers who were leading the union campaign to express a fully-formed tone and attitude of what the union was all about. For example, the article about pride in care giving showed people that the union was not only about grievances, but about also about care giving, the thing the workers cared about the most.
It was not a fluke. In every campaign after that, we always asked workers for articles and they wrote them in droves. The worker-written newsletter became the cornerstone of every campaign I ran from that point on.
Those and other experiences like them gradually woke me up. I started approaching groups of workers with the assumption that they were, taken as a whole, savvy and strategic, not apolitical and apathetic. That opened the door to all kinds of great collaborations. I started assuming these groups of people were strong, deep, strategic and concerned — “even if they were” made up of Evangelical Christians, survivalists, muscle car drivers, trailer park dwellers, pit bull breeders, and anything else my Northeastern Liberal upbringing had taught me to ridicule.
Suddenly, I was finding evidence everywhere of that strength and depth. Not only did I have more interesting conversations with people, but I also started winning union campaigns — usually by overwhelming margins. As a — I’ll admit it — snot nosed lefty kid fresh from the suburbs, it was shocking (and exciting!) for me find that every rural route and city block had its Mother Jones, and every single hospital ward or factory assembly line had its Joe Hill. I wanted to run back to college and tell my labor history professors, “Guess what! Nothing’s changed since 1934 after all!”
There has NOT been a radical change in the spirit of the people since the days of romantic, revolutionary mass organizing in America. What’s changed is that the middle-class, university-educated segment within the struggle (i.e. US) stopped playing our vital role (not THE vital role, just A vital role) because somehow we got our heads filled with all this nonsense about the people being apathetic jackasses.
After I finally left the unions, and wound up moving to the beltway, I found the same cynicism I had grown up with still alive and well among progressives there. I’d frequently trot out my evidence from the front lines. Mostly, people would just look back at me incredulously. I was working for MoveOn at the time and acquiring more evidence by the day — thanks to MoveOn’s trusting its members to run their own local events across the country. Enormous numbers of activists were taking part all the time, even in the smallest towns in the reddest states. But none of my arguments seemed to get me anywhere with people at parties cursing the “fly over states”.
For a little while I thought the Dean campaign and the massive surge of grassroots activism everywhere in 2004 might finally change progressives’ minds about the people.
But then came November 2, and the near-universal response among progressives: Blame Jesusland!
To be fair, there are actually many very good reasons why progressives find it hard to trust The People. For example, one thing that makes many progressive believe that the American people are apathetic and weak is that…well…so many people are in fact apathetic and weak. But, as it happens, groups of people are not equal to their lowest common denominators — or even to their means. Groups are much greater than the aggregate of their individual members. Someone canvassing voters in a campaign can quickly become depressed by the apathy of 9/10th of the people she talks to. But part of the art of organizing is to be able to look through that optical illusion and to see the group as a whole. It’s the same kind of complex vision one must have in any field. But somehow it’s been lost in the field of organizing.
Therefore, it’s time to relearn some of the important principles that have enabled organizers over the centuries and all around the world see the forest through the trees — or The People in the population.
1) All groups of people — even very small ones — are strong and brilliant. Sometimes that can be hard to see because the same is not true of all individuals.
Not everyone is always going to be a leader, an organizer, a strategist, a fighter. Fact is, a whole lot of people spend most of their lives behaving downright cowardly and apathetic. The whole point of this article, though, is that you make a big mistake when you use that fact to dismiss The People as a whole — or even any small group of people. That’s not how it works. “The People” (as in “We, the…”) is a structure of individuals working together in a complex way.
Don’t get me wrong. I’m not putting some people above others as people. Just as organizers. Every individual is a deep and amazing person in the sense of having lives just as full of passion, need, joy and pain as yours. And that, by the way, is the key to grasping the principle of equal worth of all people (in case you were having trouble with that!).
In fact, it is that commitment to equal worth that drives Alinskyite and Frierian organizers to want so badly to raise up every single broken soul. Yes, those people will need to go through a transformation before they become leaders in any movement. However, the mistake those organizers make, is to misunderestimate the leadership that already exists in every nook and cranny of every group. It just so happens that even when you get down to 10 people who work in a nursing home wing or live on a cul-de-sac together, you find that one or two of them are very good at running meetings, another is a great writer, another is an astute strategist, and so on in overlapping and random fashion.
Leadership is what makes even tiny groups of people strong and brilliant — but just to be doubly clear: by leadership, I’m not talking about politicians and head of big organization. (Though that’s important too!) Rather, I’m talking about the leaders on every assembly line, every hospital ward, every classroom, every apartment building floor, every stretch of rural route, etc, etc….
2) Leadership is not a role played only by “leaders,” but equally by “followers” in the act of temporarily and voluntarily granting to leaders their special role. Also: leadership is ephemeral in individuals and is sometimes expressed by the most unlikely people.
Organizers today tend not to recognize and respect the strength and dignity that “non-leaders” exercise through their conscious, voluntary and temporary allegiance to those possessed by the property of leadership at a given moment. That bias is part of what explains the general anti-leadership attitude among progressives these days — there is a widespread sense that leadership implies a lack of democracy or egalitarianism. In fact, organic grassroots leadership is what makes democracy possible.
It might help if I was more concrete. When I was working in factories during campaigns, I saw that when the union came around, immediately workers began to look to certain individuals to get their opinion on the matter. Sometimes the leaders supported the union, sometimes they rejected it, and sometimes they abstained. Those leaders therefore had the power to come together and make the union — but only because the rest of the folks were giving them that power at that moment. Those leaders didn’t “run the workplace.” They weren’t power-hungry gang leaders. Many of them actually had very small social foot prints at work. But, for all different kinds of reasons, these leaders had built up credibility and respect among the workers with regards to this particular kind of turbulent political situation.
Furthermore, the leadership of a group is not a static list. In campaigns, if you’re open to the possibility, you find that leadership is something that pops up in the most unexpected people at the most unexpected times. I remember one day when the whole future of a campaign relied on one worker reading a statement confidently and clearly to the boss in front of an assembly of workers. So who did we choose? Of course, the most confident and articulate worker on the organizing committee. When the time came, he froze and couldn’t open his mouth. He stood there with the paper shaking in his hands. The woman standing next to him took the paper from his hands and read it just as clearly and confidently as could be. What was shocking about this was that, while very respected for being a hard worker with seniority, she was known for anything but her way with words or confidence in front of other people.
3) Groups will fight for a cause only if (A) it is worth of fighting for and (B) they can see a winning plan.
When I was organizing nursing home workers, and asking them to vote for the union so that they could merely “have respect and a say on the job,” the leaders usually rejected us. But when we laid out a long term plan for organizing the whole industry in the state, and for using that power to transform the lives of care givers and patients — then the leaders chose to fight, and supported the union every time.
Think about that: In the first case, we were asking them to do almost nothing, but they wouldn’t do it; In the second case, we were asking them to commit to a 10-year ordeal, and they were all for it. The small campaign wasn’t worth their time or the risks involved; the big campaign was.
This principle also holds the answer to the inevitable question, “If the people are so strong and brilliant, then why did they vote for Bush?” First of all, they didn’t. Only about a quarter of U.S. adults voted for Bush. A lot of them were just flipping coins in their heads. Some were voting on just a few issues — the ones where the difference could be gleaned from the moments of news people catch between 11-hour work days, dinner and putting the kids to bed: Bush was going to kill the terrorists, Kerry was not so sure; Bush was anti-abortion, Kerry was pro-choice; Bush supposedly believed in Jesus, Kerry supposedly believed only in going to Church in an election season; Bush cut everyone’s taxes, Kerry was going to raise some people’s taxes.
The People didn’t make a dumb decision. Half abstained. And most of the other half chose the lesser of two evils based on the issues they cared about and the information that was available to them.
The way for a Democrat to win with a sweeping majority is to lay out a sweeping plan for real change, with a good strategy, and ask the people to fight for it. It’s been forever since anybody’s tried that. (But it is worth noting that when Howard Dean merely hinted at something like that, he ignited a revolution among the Democratic base.) Third party efforts haven’t been any different: can anyone remember the big plan to change America from Labor Party Advocates, the New Party or the Green Party/Ralph Nader 2000 campaign? Unfortunately, the world of progressive grassroots organizations is in the same boat.
Coming out with a big revolutionary plan is unthinkable for us because we don’t trust the people to fight for it. We believe in “starting small.” It’s become an explicit methodological dogma of the progressive movement: The idea is that people must first be given “small, winnable battles” and gradually, after they’ve tasted a little success, can be encouraged to bite off bigger and bigger campaigns.
But that thinking has lead us down a self-defeating spiral of un-inspiration. Here’s how it works: We lose campaigns because the people can’t be bothered to take on the “small battles” we give them. But our backwards thinking leads us to conclude that we should go back to them with even smaller battles. And as we travel this downward spiral, we find that fewer and fewer people want to participate, and that the quality of the leaders who join us diminishes too.
Because of our (false) understanding of what’s happening, it appears to us that The People are getting more and more timid and becoming worse and worse leaders. We blame TV, bad schools, religion and rampant consumerism. We actually believe that the soul of the people is changing over time. Think about how widespread and rock solid that assumption is: is there any question in our minds that people are more timid and bought-off now than they were in the days when millions of workers comprising several whole industries struck in unison for entrance into the middle class?
Because of our perception of this dumbing-down of the people, we focus more and more intensively on on “consciousness raising” and “leadership development” — to the exclusion of working with leaders who are already plenty conscious and already amazing leaders. We’ve been shrinking down our expectations until they’re practically non-existent. We been doing this for decades.
To start to get out of this trap, we’ve just got to open our minds to the possibility that the people are just as radical as they were when millions took part in sit-down strikes and the Unemployed Councils. We’ve got to recognize the possibility that the wisest, boldest leaders have been consciously refusing to participate in our campaigns because our goals have been too modest and our strategies shaky as hell.
When I look back at all the organizing that I did under the assumption that The People were weak and apathetic, I remember that, by and large, the people I was able to recruit tended to be…well…kind of weak and apathetic. But when I started organizing with the assumption that people would rise to the task of a big campaign, then amazing leaders came out of the woodwork.
Consider the possibility that the reason the leaders you’re used to need so much “development” is that only non-leaders are interested in your short-term, bite-sized campaigns. In other words, people who are un-strategic, people who have no credibility among their peers to loose, people who perhaps just have a lot of time on their hands and are bored — those are the people who are willing to risk everything for nothing, and who can’t tell the difference between a good strategy and a bad one. (Again, none of that makes them less-valuable as people, just as organizers.)
When I first saw a union campaign from inside of a facility where I was a worker, I was shocked by how differently the true workplace leaders appeared to the union organizers from how I knew them to be. I had been working in the factory for months, and I knew who the leaders were. I had seen them defend their coworkers against management attacks (risking their jobs in the process), resolve conflicts among coworkers, and welcome and train new workers. They were already running what was effectively an informal union that they had built themselves.
But when union organizers knocked on their doors, almost all these leaders said, “Everything at work is fine. I don’t want any trouble. I don’t want to lose my job. Go away.” At work I saw the conversations among those leaders that lead to the anti-union consensus. Their logic was reasonable and correct: They were concerned that the union was only organizing their one factory, out of many owned by the same company. “How,” they asked, “will we have any power when they can just move all our work to the other factories?” And they were turned off by the fact that, in the first couple days of the campaign, the union had already embraced as leaders a few people who were extremely bad news — i.e. those people who had no credibility to lose and too much time on their hands.
There. I’ve done my best to justify the leap of faith I’m asking you to take. I know there are a whole lot of organizers who didn’t grow up with my same set of deficiencies and who didn’t need to read this article at all — to you folks I apologize for the time you’ve wasted here. But it’s clear that the progressive movement overall is still suffering from a lack of trust and faith in The People. Take a leap of faith, trust The People, and I guarantee that as long as you combine that with good organizing, you won’t be disappointed.